Abstract. We examined the risk of importing and mistakenly releasing equine infectious anemia virus (EIAV)-infected horses into California. A computer simulation model was constructed to evaluate current and alternative quarantine station procedures; 150,000 iterations were performed to simulate 15 different scenarios of 10,000 horses imported into the state over a 14-year period. Simulation results showed that under current conditions of low EIAV prevalence in exporting countries, increasing the quarantine period would not decrease the number of EIAV-infected horses mistakenly released from quarantine. In a worst case scenario of high EIAV prevalence in exporting countries, the model predicted 10 EIAV-infected horses would be imported, of these 1 or none would escape detection and would be released mistakenly if quarantine duration were 3 or 14 days, respectively. This model may be applied to other quarantine station situations for evaluating the importation risk for EIAV and other diseases.
Decision makers are frequently faced with difficult questions regarding quarantine of imported animals. For example, how long must an animal remain under quarantine before release with some degree of certainty that it is not infected with an exotic or reportable disease? Alternatively, what is the probability that an animal released at a given time is infected but has not yet begun to show clinical signs or has not seroconverted? Through the use of simulation modeling, these and other complex questions may be addressed.
More than 9 million live nonavian animals were imported into the USA between 1992 and 1994. Nearly 1%, or 30,000/year, of these imports were horses. 2, 10 It is likely, given recent congressional ratification of NAFTA and GATT, that these numbers will increase in the future. In addition, when special events such as the 1996 Summer Olympics are held in the USA, additional equine importations occur.
GATT and NAFTA were designed to reduce and, in some cases, eliminate international trade barriers. Among these barriers are ''unjustified technical health standards.'' 16 As Ahl (p. 126) stated, ''the condition of 'zero risk' is unattainable''; 1 instead of eliminating all actions that involve a nonzero risk, scientists and decision makers must put risk in perspective. This may be done using a risk analysis approach.
Equine infectious anemia virus (EIAV) is a major concern for importation. It is the etiologic agent for equine infectious anemia (EIA), a reportable disease in the USA. 5 EIA is characterized by an acute phase with fever, destruction of blood cells, anemia, unthriftiness, and often edema. Most horses survive the first episode and recover because the horse produces specific neutralizing antibodies. Once infected with EIAV, a horse remains infected and seropositive for life. 8 However, many of the EIAV-seropositive horses are eventually destroyed 9 because their movement is restricted, thereby diminishing the economic value of these horses, many of which are used for breeding or racing.
Recently, the US Department of Agriculture, Veterinary Services, requested an assessment of the current quarantine practices followed in California against EIA. Here, we report a risk analysis of importation and detection of EIAV-infected horses in California. The purpose of this project was to evaluate current and alternative testing and quarantine procedures for horses entering California from abroad. Specifically, we were interested in determining the likelihood of an EIAV-infected horse entering a quarantine station and the probability of it being detected or avoiding detection.
Materials and methods
Records of horses imported into California from foreign countries were obtained from files in the California Area Office of the US Department of Agriculture, Veterinary Services. Records were analyzed to determine the distribution, by country of origin, of horses imported into California between January 1992 and July 1995. Imports from Canada, which cross the US border by land into other states prior to entry into California, and Mexico were not included because the majority were destined for slaughter and were not considered a risk for EIAV transmission.
EIAV seroprevalence information from all countries that exported horses to California between January 1992 and June 1995 was obtained from the literature. 7, 18 Because the information was categorical, countries were classified according to EIAV seroprevalence as low (0.0001-0.010%), medium (0.011-0.50%), or high (0.51-1.5%). Furthermore, within each of these categories, the minimum, mean, and maximum values for were used in the analysis to reflect low, moderate, and high prevalence estimates, respectively. For example, assuming a low prevalence estimate, 0.0001%, 0.011%, and 0.51%, respectively, were used to simulate the conditions in the exporting countries. In a worst case scenario, we assumed these values to be 0.010%, 0.50%, and 1.5%, respectively.
The agar gel immunodiffusion (AGID) test 15 is considered the international standard for diagnosis of EIA. 9 Based on experimental inoculation trials and serologic surveys, the sensitivity and specificity of the AGID test are Ն99%. 4, [13] [14] [15] 18 However, the estimated sensitivity is based on the assumption that the individual horse was not recently (Ͼ30 days) infected. Test sensitivity is very low within the first week postinfection and increases rapidly throughout the first month. 3, 4, 14 A similar relationship exists between time postinfection and sensitivity of clinical signs. 14 Therefore, in the model it was necessary to estimate the time of EIAV infection prior to serologic testing and physical examination at a quarantine station.
Cumulative distribution functions, 6 estimating sensitivity relative to days postinfection with EIAV, for the AGID test alone, clinical signs alone, and the AGID test and clinical signs combined were selected based on statistical and biologic criteria. The statistical criterion was that the selected distributions were not significantly (P Ͼ 0.05) different from the empirical data. The 2 goodness of fit and KolmogorovSmirnov test statistics were examined using a software program. a The biologic criterion was that the statistical distribution of the model fit our biologic knowledge of the immunologic and clinical process of the infection.
A simulation model was constructed using a spreadsheet program b to evaluate the risk of EIAV introduction by means of an infected horse imported through a quarantine station in California. The simulation model worked as follows. A simulated horse was exported and, depending on the route of shipment, entered a quarantine station in California 1 or 18 days later. There, the horse was tested for antibodies to EIAV using the AGID test. During the 3-day quarantine period, test results were read and the horse was observed for clinical signs of EIA. The horse was declared either EIA infected and not released within the state or EIA noninfected and released. To simulate the expected outcome for a period of 1 yr, 700 iterations were performed, representing the importation and testing of 700 horses. Multiple years were evaluated by increasing the number of simulations.
The model was based on the following assumptions.
1. Recovered horses remain infected and seropositive for 6-24 months and were considered candidates for importation into California. Although chronic infection with EIAV and its associated viremia may last for life, 16 it was assumed that horses chronically infected with EIAV would be identified relatively early and excluded from exportation. 2. EIAV-infected horses either show clinical signs or seroconvert by 45 days postinfection. 3,4,14 3. Horses clinically ill at preexport veterinary inspection will not be shipped to California until signs have resolved. If these signs are indications of EIA infection, these horses will not be shipped. 4. Horses seropositive on the AGID test will not be shipped to California either because the veterinarian at the export country will not permit shipment of a positive horse or one showing clinical signs of EIA or because the owner will voluntarily not ship the horse because of the high probability of detection and the cost associated with returning the horse to its country of origin. 5. Although the number of days prior to importation that the test was conducted is not known, it was believed that all horses were tested for EIAV antibodies within 75 days of shipment (sensitivity ϭ 100% by 45 days postinfection ϩ 30 days maximum posttesting shipment time). Beyond 75 days postinfection, all EIAV-infected horses were presumed to be seropositive and would not be shipped. 6. The greatest sensitivity value associated with the AGID test, clinical signs, or the combination of the two was used to classify a horse at the quarantine station as EIAV infected. 7. For horses shipped by air, 1 day was added to the time between initial physical examination and serologic testing at country of origin, and inspection on arrival in California. Eighteen days were added for horses shipped by sea. During the study period, all horses arriving in California were shipped by air except those from New Zealand, which represented 12% of horses shipped from low-risk countries. 8. The initial model simulated the currently followed 3-day quarantine practice, i.e., blood samples are obtained on day 1 and horses are observed for clinical signs throughout the quarantine period.
The model is stochastic (probabilities assigned to events occurring were random). Five variables used in the model were assumed to be stochastic: EIA risk classification of country of origin (low, medium, high), transportation route (air, sea), maximum duration of infection (6, 12, or 24 mo), time tested prior to shipment (1-75 days), and days post-EIAV infection. A spreadsheet add-in c was used to simulate the distributions of the random variables used in the model.
Because it was assumed that only animals infected within 75 days would not be detected prior to export, it was necessary to determine the expected number of horses infected within a 75-day period. Therefore, the 75-day incidence rate of EIA for each exporting country was determined by dividing the estimated prevalence of EIA for that country by the presumed duration of infection. Although most horses survive with lifetime infection, most horses known to be infected are slaughtered because of international restrictions on movement, resulting in an artificially shortened duration of infection. Seventy-five-day incidence rates were calculat- ed by dividing the country-specific prevalence by the assumed duration of infection of 180-730 days, representing 6-24 mo. The 75-day incidence rate was multiplied by the probability of a false negative (1 Ϫ sensitivity) result in preshipping testing and examination to determine the probability that an EIAV-infected horse could be both subclinically infected and seronegative at the time of release from quarantine in California.
Nine different scenarios were evaluated, based on the combinations of 3 different durations of infection (6, 12 , and 24 mo) and with the effect of either halving or doubling the EIAV incidence in the country of origin and modifying the presumed country EIAV prevalence: low, moderate, or high. The basic model was run for 9 simulations of 10,000 iterations each to mimic the importation of 700-715 horses/ yr over a 14-yr period, assuming the various durations of infection and presumed country prevalences discussed above.
Sensitivity analysis of the model was performed for 6 additional scenarios by simulating the effects of increasing quarantine duration from 3 days (current requirement) to 7 and 14 days for the 3 (low, moderate, high) EIAV prevalence estimates. An additional 60,000 iterations were performed for the sensitivity analysis.
Results
Three cumulative distribution functions and their respective parameters were selected to represent the sensitivity of detecting an EIAV-infected horse (Fig. 1) . The distributions (and associated parameters) were loglogistic (7.00, 13.01, 4.30) for AGID test sensitivity; lognormal (3.00, 0.62) for clinical signs sensitivity, and lognormal (2.70, 0.75) for combined AGID test and clinical signs sensitivity. 6 For any given day postinfection, the maximum sensitivity for an individual (AGID test or clinical signs) or combined statistical distribution was assumed to be the sensitivity for EIAV infection while the horse was in quarantine.
A total of 1,949 horses entered the Los Angeles quarantine station from October 1, 1992 through June 30, 1995, for an average of 709 horses/year (Table 1) . Of these, none showed clinical signs of EIA nor had a positive AGID test result. Assuming a 12-month duration of infection, the prevalence estimates that generated simulation results identical to those observed in California since 1992 were the low prevalence estimates. These prevalence and duration of infection estimates were used as the base level values in the model.
The model predicted 0, 7, and 10 EIAV-infected horses entering the quarantine station, if the quarantine period were 3 days and the presumed prevalence estimates were low, moderate, or high, respectively (Table 2). Therefore, the model predicted that 0-10 infected horses would arrive in quarantine in California over a period of 14 years, depending on the exporting country EIAV prevalence assumption. Of the EIAVinfected horses, it was predicted that 1 of 7 (moderate prevalence assumption) or 1 of 10 (high prevalence assumption) would not be detected while in a 3-day quarantine. In other words, it was predicted that during the 14-year period 1 EIAV-infected horse would be * TϪ ϭ an EIAV-infected horse that was found test negative (negative AGID test, no clinical signs) during quarantine and was released. Tϩ ϭ an EIAV-infected horse that was detected during quarantine and not released.
† Estimate of prevalence of EIAV in the country of origin.
released incorrectly as noninfected if the presumed prevalence were either moderate or high.
Increasing the quarantine to 7 days permitted sufficient time to detect all EIAV-infected horses, assuming a moderate prevalence. However, to detect all EIAV-infected horses under the high prevalence assumption, it was necessary to increase the quarantine period to 14 days.
Discussion
Because data from multiple sources were used to estimate the sensitivity distributions, apparent inconsistencies were observed (Fig. 1) . For example, after 22 days postinfection with EIAV, the predicted sensitivity of the AGID test alone exceeded that based on the combined AGID test and clinical signs. For the purposes of this study, this paradox was assumed to be due to experimental design difference of the respective studies. Therefore, to adjust for this inconsistency, the decision rule selected for the model was to use the combined sensitivity (test ϩ clinical signs) unless the sensitivity of one of the individual criteria (test ‫گ‬ or clinical signs) exceeded the sensitivity of the combined test and clinical signs results. In such cases, the sensitivity of the individual test was selected.
As reported earlier, a number of sources were used to estimate EIAV country prevalences. These prevalence estimates were biased in that they reflect a population purposefully tested for animals destined for export. The estimates are not intended to reflect the respective countrywide prevalences. Furthermore, although it is not possible to evaluate the validity or quality of these prevalence estimates, available data were used because they represented the best possible guess, a practice common in risk assessment. One of the benefits of this approach is that a model can be constructed and evaluated, and then determine which variables the model is most sensitive to can be determined; efforts can then be focused on improving those estimates. According to our model results, the estimates used were sufficiently accurate. Results obtained from this analysis when moderate and high prevalence estimates were assumed agree with those observed in the USA. Five to 10 reactors are found annually among the approximately 10,000 horses/year examined by the National Veterinary Services Laboratory (Ames, IA) for antibodies to EIAV over the past 3 years. The vast majority (Ͼ99%) of these test-positive horses were imported from outside the USA (A. D. Alstead, personal communication). Equine imports into the USA are more likely from countries that have a distribution similar to that of our moderate and high prevalence estimates. Therefore, our findings for the extended quarantine analysis should be appropriate for the USA as a whole.
Examination of an extended quarantine period (7 and 14 days) is valuable for a number of reasons. First, because of a recent outbreak of Venezuelan equine encephalitis in Mexico, a 7-day quarantine period was in place from July 1993 through February 1995 for horses imported into California from Mexico. Although samples were collected from horses the day they entered quarantine, because horses were held an additional 4 days (after day 3) it would have been a reasonable alternative to sample these horses on the 5th rather than the 1st day under quarantine. In this way an additional 4 days would be added to the number of days postinfection, thereby increasing the sensitivity of the AGID test. Second, the benefit of extending the quarantine period is a logical step in evaluating the risk/benefit of quarantine station performance.
Currently, approximately 700 horses, not including those from Mexico and Canada, are imported into California annually. Results of the simulation modeling showed that even if incidence or prevalence of EIAV infection in countries exporting horses to California increased and the duration of quarantine were increased from 3 to 7 or 14 days, 1 EIAV-infected horse would escape detection every 14 years (or 10,000 horses). Considering that 0.01% of the horses (approximately 5/48,000) AGID tested in California and 0.2% of the horses at large in the United States are considered infected with EIAV, 11, 12 it is inconsistent to require more stringent quarantine measures, such as the increased time, because it would in essence impose stricter restrictions on imported than on domestic horses.
For a reportable disease, such as EIA, that is already endemic in the state, the current risk assumed under existing quarantine station procedures appears acceptable. However, for exotic diseases such as dourine, glanders, or piroplasmosis (other equine diseases currently tested for during quarantine), the expected risk of 1 introduction per 14 years, which was predicted for EIA when a moderate or high prevalence in exporting countries was assumed, may be unnecessarily high, warranting action to reduce the risk of introduction of an infected animal.
In addition to the variables selected in our sensitivity analysis, the choice of serologic test used could also be examined. In the case of EIA, an alternative serologic test, such as the competitive enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (CELISA), may be applied. However, because CELISA and AGID test results are highly correlated (99.8%), 11 the impact of using the CELISA was not examined.
This analysis presents a dynamic (changing) interpretation of the commonly presumed static nature of test sensitivity. This model could be modified slightly and used by regulatory and diagnostic laboratory officials for a variety of diseases and animal species. Our results also demonstrate the value of simulation modeling when necessary experimentation with animals at the quarantine station is economically and politically infeasible.
The findings reported in this paper should not be interpreted to mean that because no horses have been detected as infected with EIAV, testing at quarantine should be discontinued. Rather, testing should continue because it appears to be a successful method of reducing or even eliminating the threat of introducing EIAV-infected horses into California.
Although the results reported in this study are specific for the importation of horses infected with EIAV into California, the model developed to evaluate this problem was designed to be sufficiently robust so that it could be applied to different infections, animal species, and locations. For example, to evaluate the risk of importing an EIAV-infected horse in another state or nation, the distribution of exporting countries would need to be manipulated in the model, leading to a modification of the distribution of low-, medium-, and high-risk exporting countries. The only other modification to the model would be in the probability and the associated duration of a shipment coming by sea vs. air. All other values would remain unchanged. Similarly, to evaluate a different disease, several assumptions may need to be altered, e.g., disease prevalence, duration of infectiousness, latent period, test sensitivity, and specificity. Such modifications are minor, with respect to changes in the model itself. Risk analysis is a useful technique that may be applied by a decision maker who is faced with a complex and seemingly intractable question such as the risk of importation of an exotic disease. 
